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This paper analyses the possibility and the consequences of rational bubbles in a dynamic economy
where financially constrained firms demand and supply liquidity. Bubbles are more likely to emerge,
the scarcer the supply of outside liquidity and the more limited the pledgeability of corporate income;
they crowd investment in (out) when liquidity is abundant (scarce). We analyse extensions with firm
heterogeneity and stochastic bubbles.
Key words: Liquidity, Bubbles
JEL Codes: E2, E44
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite some progress in our understanding of asset price bubbles, many challenging questions
are left unanswered. What role do macroeconomic conditions and financial institutions play in
the emergence of bubbles? Is the classic theory of rational bubbles correct in predicting that
bubbles raise interest rates and crowd out productive investment?1 Symmetrically, what are the
consequences of bubble crashes? Do bubbles benefit/hurt some sectors more than others? What
is the appropriate test for the existence of bubbles? Is there a link between dynamic inefficiency
and the possibility of bubbles?
This paper investigates these questions by adding to the standard growth model an asyn-
chronicity between firms’ access to and need for cash. While this asynchronicity is perfectly
resolved by capital markets in classic growth theory, capital markets here are imperfect: factors
such as agency costs prevent firms from pledging the entirety of the benefits from investment to
outside investors, resulting in credit rationing. The anticipation of credit rationing in turn gives
rise to a familiar demand for liquidity (or stores of value; we will use the two terms interchange-
ably). Firms also supply liquidity by issuing securities, i.e. claims to their future revenues. Each
firm is at times a net demander of liquidity or a net supplier of liquidity.
At the heart of this paper is the interplay between different forms of liquidity. Specifically,
we investigate the interaction of inside liquidity (securities issued by financially constrained
firms), outside liquidity (assets that originate in a different sector in the economy), and bubbles.
1. While the interest rate response is rather undisputed, some famous episodes seem consistent with a crowding in
hypothesis. For example, Japan’s bubble came with not only high interest rates but also vigorous investment and growth;
when it bursts, the country went through a prolonged deflation and recession. Similarly, in the U.S., the Internet and
housing bubbles were accompanied with economic booms; interest rates and investment fell when these bubbles burst.
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Literally speaking, bubbles are a form of outside liquidity, but because they are the focus of this
paper, we choose to single them out.
The impact of outside liquidity on investment and economic activity accordingly hinges on
the relative potency of two effects: a liquidity effect and a leverage effect. On the demand side,
the firm’s hoarding of liquidity makes them benefit from an increase in the supply and a reduction
in the price of liquidity. On the supply side, their issuing securities to finance investment makes
them vulnerable to high interest rate conditions: an increase in outside liquidity raises interest
rates and competes with the securities issued by the firms, reducing their leverage.
This paper makes several contributions. First, as we just discussed, it studies the interplay
between inside and outside liquidity. Outside liquidity helps firms address the asynchronicity
between their access to and need for cash—the liquidity effect—but also competes for savings
with productive investment—the leverage effect. We show that the liquidity effect dominates
when outside liquidity is abundant.
Second, this paper shows that bubbles are more likely to exist and can be larger when agency
problems are severe (firms can only pledge a small fraction of their future revenues), outside
liquidity is scarce and the demand for liquidity is high (the net worth of firms is high).2
Third, bubbles are a form of outside liquidity. They are more likely to crowd the financially
constrained corporate sector’s investment in (out), the more (less) abundant the outside liquidity.
Fourth, the crash of a bubble is accompanied by low interest rates and high leverage. It has a
negative effect on firms’ financial net worth and further reduces liquidity. Consequently, even in
a risk-neutral environment, a stochastic bubble carries a liquidity premium (it features positive
excess returns relative to the risk-free rate) since it pays little or zero in states where internal
funds can be levered the most. Furthermore, bubble bursts can be endogenously triggered by ad-
verse shocks to corporate net worth, resulting in a liquidity dry-up: financial disruptions amplify
real disturbances.
Fifth, bubbles, and more generally outside liquidity, impact firms differently. Firms with
limited ability to pledge future cash flows are little hit by competing claims as they issue no or
few securities. They benefit more from a bubble. They are also more eager to hold stochastic
bubbles.
Finally, in standard models of rational bubbles (e.g. Tirole, 1985), bubbles can occur only if
the economy is dynamically inefficient so that tests aimed at detecting dynamic inefficiency can
be used to determine if bubbles are possible. In our environment, Abel et al. (1989)’s finding that
the productive sector disgorges at least as much as it invests does indicate that the economy is
dynamically efficient. The possibility of bubbles is determined by the condition that the interest
rate be higher than the growth rate of the economy, in conformity with Santos and Woodford
(1997).3 But with imperfect capital markets, the economy can be dynamically efficient, and
at the same time, the interest rate can be lower than the growth rate of the economy. This is
because the social rate of return on internal funds exceeds that on borrowed funds; therefore,
the social rate of return on investments is higher than the market interest rate when returns can
be only imperfectly collateralized. As a result, bubbles are possible even when the economy is
dynamically efficient. 4
2. Accordingly, the much discussed “global savings glut” may have contributed to the recent housing bubble in
the U.S. by creating a shortage of liquidity (stores of value). The low real interest rates that accompanied this episode
are consistent with this narrative. To be certain, there are also other causes (failure of prudential regulation, etc.).
3. Moreover, our agency-based approach argues in favour of the use of (relatively low) interest rates received by
outside investors such as the interest rate on riskless bonds.
4. Typically, bubbles do not lead to Pareto improvements. For example, the holders of outside liquidity in general
lose from the emergence of a bubble, since the latter increases interest rates and lowers the price at which they can sell
the outside liquidity. Similarly, equilibria with bubble crashes are usually not Pareto dominated by equilibria with no
bubble crash.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and describes the solution when
there are no bubbles. It characterizes its unique steady state and derives some key comparative
statics results. Section 3 introduces the possibility of rational asset price bubbles. It derives the
dynamics with bubbles and describes the properties of the unique bubbly steady state. Section
4 first analyses how bubbles affect the cross section of firms when there is heterogeneity in
pledgeability; it then introduces stochastic bubbles and derives the mechanics of a bubbly boom-
bust episode. Section 5 checks the robustness of the results in several variants of the model.
Finally, Section 6 summarizes the main insights and discusses alleys for research. Most of the
proofs are contained in the Appendix, as well as in an Online Appendix.
1.1. Relation to the literature
The paper builds on a number of contributions. Most obviously, it brings together the literature
on (rational) bubbles and that on aggregate liquidity. The leverage effect, however, differs from
the related competition effect featured in Diamond (1965)’s celebrated analysis of national debt
and is prominent in the theory of rational bubbles (Tirole, 1985), whereby bubbles crowd in-
vestment out. The standard competition effect captures the idea that unconstrained firms want to
invest less when interest rates are high. Our leverage effect has it that high interest rates aggra-
vate credit rationing and so firms cannot invest as much. In particular, Diamond’s competition
effect is inconsistent with the existence of a liquidity effect.
The role of stores of values in supporting investment when income is not fully pledgeable
has been stressed e.g. by Woodford (1990), Holmström and Tirole (1998), and a large recent
literature, including independent contributions by Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) and Kocherlakota
(2009). In Woodford’s and Kocherlakota’s contributions, which are most closely related to ours,
firms are net demanders of liquidity and there is always a potential shortage of stores of value.
These two papers assume that firms cannot supply liquidity (they have zero leverage) by positing
that none of the future cash flow is pledgeable to investors and so firms do not issue securities.
The possibility of leverage is central to many of our insights (existence of liquidity and leverage
effects, conditions for the existence of bubbles, impact of bubbles on the cross section of firms).5
Saint-Paul (2005) shows that government debt (a store of value), while deterring capital
accumulation, can increase the efficiency of the financial sector. Entrepreneurs can buy public
debt and use it as collateral. The existence of collateral reduces agency costs (Saint-Paul uses the
costly-state-verification model as an illustration). Accordingly, public debt boosts growth over a
range of parameters.
The paper shares with Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) the idea that investment decisions are
intertemporal complements. In Kiyotaki–Moore, tomorrow’s investment will raise the price of
the store of value, which is used as an input in the production process; this future increase in the
price of the store of value raises the firms’ wealth and thereby today’s investment. In our paper,
it is yesterday’s investment that supports today’s investment by creating securities that firms can
hoard to meet their liquidity needs. Thus, Kiyotaki and Moore’s dynamics are forward looking
while ours are essentially backward looking (in the absence of bubbles). Also, Kiyotaki–Moore’s
focus is rather different as it has no bubbles.
The rational bubble literature has addressed the crowding-out critique in alternative ways.6
Bubbles are attached to investment in Oliver (2000) and to entrepreneurship in Ventura (2003),
5. As we show in Appendix A.3, the mechanism through which bubbles may crowd investment in is very different
in our model and in Woodford (1990) or Kocherlakota (2009).
6. Other theories based on agency problems and asymmetric information as well as behavioural models have
proliferated in recent years. A partial list includes Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), Allen and Gale (2000), Allen
and Gorton (1993), Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993), Barlevy (2009), Conlon (2004), Doblas-Madrid (2009), and
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generating an incentive and a wealth effect, respectively; in both papers, bubbles can crowd in-
vestment in. Saint-Paul (1992), Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), and King and Ferguson (1993)
address the dynamic-efficiency critique by studying endogenous growth models with bubbles,
in which the social return on investment exceeds the private return due to spillovers.7
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) developed a theory of bubbles in emerging markets.
They introduced, as we do, an investment-driven demand for liquidity and showed that in the
presence of fragile (stochastic) bubbles, the economy overinvests in the bubbly asset and is
overexposed to bubble crashes due to a pecuniary externality.
Our paper also sheds some light on the debate as to whether monetary authorities should
try to lean against bubbles (or, in a more extreme form, try to make them pop) by raising inter-
est rates or denying access to the discount window to banks that extend too many loans. Some
scholars (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 2000, 2001; Bernanke, 2002; Gilchrist and Leahy, 2002)
argue that the central bank should not pay attention to asset prices unless these signal future
inflation; others (e.g. Bordo and Jeanne, 2002) are in favour of a moderate reaction.8 All con-
cur that a restrictive policy leads to a lower output and a significant risk of collateral-induced
credit crunch. Our model is consistent with this premise, as the pricking of the bubble leads to a
collateral shortage and reduced investment and production.
Our paper is related to several strands of the monetary literature. It has been well-known
since Allais (1947)’s and Samuelson (1958)’s seminal contributions that there exists economies
in which money has a positive value in spite of the fact that it is intrinsically useless.9 In those
models, money can be readily reinterpreted as a rational bubble, a fact long recognized in the
rational bubbles literature. Our paper is also related to a more recent strand of the monetary the-
ory literature often referred to as the New Monetarist literature. It emphasizes the role of money
and other assets in overcoming trading frictions in economies with decentralized trade. Because
of problems related to the double coincidence of wants, imperfect commitment, enforcement,
and record keeping, unsecured credit is not viable and some trades must quid pro quo, involving
either the sale of an asset or a collateralized loan. Such set-ups give rise to endogenous liquidity
premia. Williamson and Wright (2011) and Nosal and Rocheteau (2011) provide excellent sur-
veys. Most closely related to us is Rocheteau and Wright (2010). They build on the extension by
Rocheteau and Wright (2005) of the model of Lagos and Wright (2005) and include endogenous
participation decisions. Some of their results resemble ours. Indeed, in their model, liquid assets
can trade above their fundamental value if the aggregate supply of liquid assets is low. They
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). See LeRoy (2004) for a good survey. These theories typically reach more precise pre-
dictions than rational bubbles models regarding which assets are more likely to feature bubbles and have a rich array of
implications for volume, turnover etc. However, these contributions have for the most part retained a more microeco-
nomic focus and have not analysed the liquidity-provision function of bubbles.
7. The long-term rate of interest can then be smaller than the rate of growth of the economy, and yet the economy
be dynamically efficient. However, the condition for the existence of bubbles is still determined by the condition that the
growth rate of the economy be higher than the interest rate. Our results are reminiscent of their findings. However, in our
paper, the reason that the social rate of return on investment is higher than the interest rate is fundamentally different:
it does not stem from an externality in production but rather from an agency problem such as moral hazard or limited
commitment. As a result, only a fraction of the return to investment can be pledged to outside investors, and the rest is
appropriated by entrepreneurs (and more generally by insiders of the firm in a broader interpretation of the model). The
interest rate reflects the fraction of the return to investment which is pledgeable to outside investors, whereas the social
rate of return on investment accounts for the total return on investment—both the pledgeable part and the unpledgeable
part which is appropriated by entrepreneurs.
8. This is only a partial list of references on the topic. See Adrian and Shin (2008) for a more complete list.
9. Overlapping generations models with money have been later thoroughly developed by Gale (1973), Cass,
Okumo and Zilcha (1979), Wallace (1980), Hahn (1982), Balasko and Shell (1981), Grandmont (1985), among others.
A textbook treatment can be found in Azariadis (1993).
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also generate multiple stationary equilibria where asset prices and output are positively related.
Moreover, they also construct non-stationary equilibria, even when fundamentals are determin-
istic and non-stochastic. These include equilibria with price trajectories that resemble bubbles
growing and bursting. An important difference with us is that, using the language of our model,
they focus on liquidity effects and assume away leverage effects.10
2. THE MODEL
2.1. Description
2.1.1. Demographics, preferences, and technology. Our model has overlapping gener-
ations of risk-neutral entrepreneurs. The population is constant (all our results generalize to the
case of positive population growth). Entrepreneurs live for three periods: young, middle-aged,
and old. For simplicity, we assume that entrepreneurs consume only when old. They are risk
neutral and seek to maximize expected consumption. Each generation is indexed by the period
in which it is born. Time runs from t = 0 to t =∞. At each date t = 0,1, . . . ,∞, the economy
is inhabited by the old (generation t − 2), the middle-aged (generation t − 1), and the young
(generation t).
There is a single good in the economy. When young, entrepreneurs of generation t are en-
dowed with A units of good (wealth). When middle-aged, they invest it+1 to produce ρ1it+1
when old. However, only a fraction ρ0it+1 < ρ1it+1 of the return on investment is pledgeable,
where ρ1 > ρ0 > 0.
2.1.2. Market for liquidity. In every period, a market for liquidity allows entrepreneurs
to lend and borrow, subject to the borrowing constraints imposed by the limited pledgeability
of their future income. The interest rate prevailing between date t and date t + 1 is 1+ rt+1. In
equilibrium, it will always be the case that the pledgeability parameter ρ0 is strictly less than 1+
rt+1, otherwise middle-aged entrepreneurs could achieve an infinite investment scale. Because
pledgeability is limited, firms can only partially rely on outside financing at the investment
stage. We will only analyse equilibria where ρ1 > 1+ rt+1 so that the investment opportunities
of entrepreneurs are strictly positive net-present-value projects.
The ingredients that determine supply and demand in the market for liquidity are as follows.
The asynchronicity between the availability of cash and investment opportunities, together with
the imperfect pledgeability of cash flows from investment, lead to a demand for liquidity (stores
of value) from young entrepreneurs: they purchase assets in their youth when they have wealth11
and sell them in their middle age when they have an attractive investment opportunity that can
only be partially financed by the market. In turn, middle-aged entrepreneurs are also suppliers
of liquidity: they supply assets which capitalize the pledgeable cash flows from their investment
project.
At the heart of this paper is the interplay between different forms of liquidity. Specifically,
we investigate the interaction of inside liquidity (assets produced by middle-aged entrepreneurs
of generation t when they pledge a fraction of the return on their investment project), outside liq-
uidity (assets that originate in a different sector in the economy), and bubbles. Literally speaking,
bubbles are a form of outside liquidity, but because they are the focus of this paper, we choose
to single them out.
10. More precisely, the absence of leverage effects is tied to their assumption that shares in firms provide no
liquidity service.
11. That the entrepreneurs are net savers when young follows Woodford (1990). The results, however, only hinge
on their having a demand for liquidity available in their middle age.
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We model outside liquidity as follows. At each point of time t , there is a net supply of l units
of Lucas trees or “rents”: date-t trees each pay one unit of good at date t +1. These assets will
be purchased in equilibrium by young entrepreneurs so as to be able to invest when middle-aged.
We will focus on the case where l ≥ 0. In extensions in Sections 5.1 and 5.3, we explain how in
some cases it can make sense to examine the case l < 0. Section 5.1 explains how our analysis
differs in this case. At this stage, we only offer a simple model of the owners of these assets:
they are completely passive and supply them inelastically: l is just an exogenous supply and
the focus is entirely on entrepreneurs. One possible micro-foundation is that at each date t , one-
period-lived date-t consumers are endowed with trees paying a dividend equal to l at date t+1.
These consumers live only in period t and need to consume at that date. We will encounter in
Section 5.3 other micro-foundations for outside liquidity in which l may respond to the interest
rate; as we will see, the theory extends to such situations.
Liquidity can also come in the form of a rational bubble. The bubble is an asset in unit supply
that pays no dividend. We denote by bt ≥ 0, the value of the bubble at date t .
In the basic model, all these forms of liquidity—securities issued by middle-aged
entrepreneurs, trees, and the bubble—are riskless assets. No arbitrage requires all these assets to
have the same rate of return 1+ rt+1 between dates t and t+1.
2.1.3. The problem of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs invest all their wealth in their
youth in assets—trees, the bubble, and investment projects of the previous generation—and use
these savings when middle-aged as internal funds for their investment project. In their youth,
entrepreneurs of generation t must decide how much to spend Alt , on trees, how much Abt of the
bubble to acquire, and how much Ait to invest in securities issued by entrepreneurs of generation
t−1
A = Alt + Abt + Ait .
At date t +1, the total resources available for investment for date-t entrepreneurs are the value
of the claims on the future cash flows from their investment ρ0it+1/(1+rt+2) and the date t+1
value of its portfolio of trees Alt , bubbles Abt , and securities Ait issued by the previous generation
of entrepreneurs. All these assets have the same return 1+ rt+1. Hence,
it+1 = ρ0it+11+ rt+2 + (1+ rt+1)[A
l
t + Abt + Ait ] or it+1 =
(1+ rt+1)[Alt + Abt + Ait ]
1− ρ01+rt+2
.
As is standard from the corporate finance literature, investment it+1 increases with the en-
trepreneurs’ net worth (1+ rt+1)[Alt + Abt + Ait ] at the time when the investment is made. The
investment multiplier 1/[1−ρ0/(1+ rt+2)] is a measure of leverage. It increases with the frac-
tion of income that is pledgeable to investors ρ0 and decreases with the interest rate 1+ rt+2
through the decrease in the value of the collateral generated by the project.12
2.1.4. Discussion. We have adopted a framework with overlapping generations of en-
trepreneurs. The concept of generation should not be interpreted too literally—a period in our
12. We also need to specify what happens with the initial middle-aged and the initial old entrepreneurs in period
0. We assume that the initial old entrepreneurs have invested at scale i−1 and pledged a fraction ρ0i−1 of this return in
the form of securities issued to the inital middle-aged entrepreneurs. At date 0, the value of the portfolio of the initial
middle-aged entrepreneurs is equal to the sum of the value of the bubble b0, the dividend ρ0i−1 on the securities issued
by the initial old entrepreneurs, and the dividend l on the trees. The resources available for investment for the initial
middle-aged entrepreneurs in period 0 are the sum of the value of their portfolio and the value ρ0i0/(1+ r1) of the
securities that they sell to the initial young entrepreneurs.
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model need not last for 25 years. Rather, overlapping generations are the simplest modelling
device that allows us to capture two features that are essential for our analysis. First, at any point
of time, some entrepreneurs are net suppliers of liquidity while others are net demanders of liq-
uidity. Second, interest rates can be lower than the rate of growth of the economy (here, zero),
which makes room for rational bubbles.
Other modelling options would have delivered the same features. For example, we could
have analysed a model à la Woodford (1990) where entrepreneurs are segmented into groups
with alternating investment opportunities and borrowing constraints. Or we could have opted
for a model à la Aiyagari (1994), Bewley (1986), and Hirano and Yanagawa (2010) where the
investment opportunities of entrepreneurs are stochastic, with idiosyncratic risk (and possibly
aggregate risk as well). Under both types of models, occasionally binding borrowing constraints
segments the horizons of agents with essentially the same effects as overlapping generations.
The potential benefit of Aiyagari–Bewley models over ours is that they are in principle more
suitable for realistic quantitative explorations. However, the parameters for a realistic calibration
in the context of our model (i.e. a precautionary savings model for firms instead of the more cus-
tomary income fluctuation problem for consumers) are currently largely unknown. Moreover,
this benefit has to be weighted against the cost in terms of loss of tractability. Indeed, the dy-
namics of such models can be hard to characterize theoretically because of the need to keep
track of the evolving cross-sectional distribution of wealth. By contrast, we are able to derive
the solution of our model in closed form. Since our objective is mostly theoretical, we view our
model as preferable.
2.2. Competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium imposes market clearing: Alt = l/(1+ rt+1), Abt = bt , and Ait =
ρ0it/(1+ rt+1). We will use a version of recursive equilibrium as our running definition. The
economy is amenable to a recursive representation with two-state variables: past investment
it−1 and the bubble bt . The laws of motion for these variables can be derived from three simple
equations: a bubble dynamics equation, an asset supply equation, and an asset demand equation.
2.2.1. Bubble dynamics. The absence of arbitrage implies that the bubble must grow at
the rate of interest
bt+1 = (1+ rt+1)bt . (1)
2.2.2. Asset supply. The supply equation describes how generation (t −1)’s investment
at date t is constrained by the available liquidity, l+bt +ρ0it−1, and by the investment-related
pledgeable income, ρ0it/(1+ rt+1) ,
it = ρ0it1+ rt+1 + [l+bt +ρ0it−1]
and can be expressed as
it = l+bt +ρ0it−11− ρ01+rt+1
. (2)
2.2.3. Asset demand. The demand equation says that generation t’s wealth goes into
buying outside liquidity (l), the bubble, and the assets generated by the previous generation’s
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investment (ρ0it )
A = l
1+ rt+1 +bt +
ρ0it
1+ rt+1 .
It can be expressed as
it = A(1+ rt+1)− l−bt (1+ rt+1)
ρ0
. (3)
We define a competitive equilibrium as a sequence of investment levels, bubble, and interest
rates {it ,bt ,rt } such that, at every date t, the asset market clears. We need to specify the follow-
ing initial conditions: the investment level i−1 of generation−1 maturing at date 0 and the value
b0 of the bubble at date 0.
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a sequence {it ,bt ,rt }t≥0 together with an initial
investment level i−1 > 0 and an initial bubble b0 such that: (i) the bubble condition (1), and the
asset supply and asset demand equations (2) and (3) hold; (ii) for all t ≥ 0, it ≥ 0, bt ≥ 0, and
ρ1 > 1+ rt ≥ ρ0.
Note that in a competitive equilibrium, we necessarily have 1+ rt > ρ0 for all t , otherwise
middle-aged entrepreneurs would invest at an infinite scale, which is impossible because the
resources available for investment are bounded.
2.3. The bubble-free case
Let us first assume that b0 = 0. This implies that bt = 0 for all t . The economy is a one-
dimensional dynamic system with state variable it−1. Given it−1, we now explain how it can
be computed using equations (2) and (3) with bt = 0. Detailed derivations can be found in
Appendix A.1.
2.3.1. Dynamics. The asset supply equation (2) determines it as a decreasing function
of rt+1, and the asset demand equation (3) determines it as an increasing function of rt+1. As
1+ rt+1 increases from ρ0 to +∞, the supply curve decreases from +∞ to (l + ρ0it−1) and
the demand curve increases from (A− l/ρ0) to +∞. The unique intersection of these supply
and demand curves with (1+ rt+1) ∈ (ρ0,+∞) determines the values of it > 0 and 1+ rt+1 >
ρ0.13 We denote by it =8i (it−1,0), rt+1 =8r (it−1,0), the corresponding policy functions. The
argument “0” in8i (it−1,0) and8r (it−1,0) indicates that we have imposed bt = 0. In Appendix
A.1, we derive closed-form expressions for 8i (it−1,0) and 8r (it−1,0).
2.3.2. Inside and outside liquidity. The productive sector provides its own liquidity in a
dynamic fashion: an increase in it−1 leads to an increase in it . Indeed, an increase in it−1 leads
to an upward shift in the asset supply curve (2) and does not affect the asset demand curve (3).
The result is an increase in investment it and an increase in the interest rate 1+ rt+1.
The asset supply and asset demand equations (2) and (3) can also be used to determine
the impact of outside liquidity (l) on investment it for a given it−1 (see Figure 1). Given it−1,
increasing outside liquidity l shifts the asset supply curve (2) upwards and the asset demand
curve (3) downwards. The interest rate rt+1 unambiguously increases. The effect on investment
it is ambiguous. Indeed, using the asset supply equation it = (l+ρ0it−1)/[1−ρ0/(1+ rt+1)],
13. This derivation assumes that ρ1 is large enough so that ρ1 > 1+rt+1. As stated above, we focus on equilibria
which verify this property.
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FIGURE 1
Asset supply and asset demand curves. The dotted curves represent the effects of an increase in l (Section 2) or bt
(Section 3)
the impact of the increase in outside liquidity on investment can be decomposed into two effects.
On the one hand, increasing outside liquidity l increases the net worth l+bt +ρ0it−1 of middle-
aged entrepreneurs at date t—a liquidity effect. Also, and as noted above, increasing outside
liquidity increases the interest rate rt+1. As a result, leverage 1/[1−ρ0/(1+ rt+1)] decreases,
which just expresses the fact that financing is harder when interest rates are high. This we call
the leverage effect. The resulting effect on investment it at date t is ambiguous.
Intuitively, firms demand liquidity which is akin to an input in production. This tends to
make investment and outside liquidity complements. But investments made by the private sector
also play the role of inside liquidity. Inside liquidity is in direct competition with outside liq-
uidity. This tends to make investment and outside liquidity substitutes. This distinction between
the liquidity effect and the leverage effect also has a temporal dimension. Existing liquidity—
inside liquidity it−1 or outside liquidity l—and contemporaneous investment it are complements.
Future outside liquidity and contemporaneous investment it are substitutes.
2.3.3. Steady state. To solve for a steady state (i∗,r∗) of the bubble-free economy, we
look for a solution to the system of equations obtained by imposing it = it−1 = i∗ and rt+1 = r∗
in the asset supply and asset demand equations (2) and (3)
i∗ = l+ρ0i
∗
1− ρ01+r∗
and i∗ = A(1+ r
∗)− l
ρ0
. (4)
There is a unique solution with i∗ ≥ 0 and 1+ r∗ ≥ ρ0. In Appendix A.1, we provide a closed-
form solution for i∗ and r∗. The following proposition establishes that this steady state is stable
and summarizes the dynamics of the bubble-free economy.14
14. When l > 0 (this is also true of the case l < 0 analysed in Section 5.1), this is the unique solution of the system
of equations in (4) with positive investment i∗ ≥ 0. When l = 0, there is another solution of the system of equations in
(4) with positive investment: i∗ = 0 and 1+ r∗ = 0. However, this is not a competitive equilibrium, since a necessary
condition is 1+ r∗ > ρ0.
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Proposition 1. Let {it ,rt }t≥0 be a competitive equilibrium of the bubble-free economy. The
economy converges to the bubble-free steady state. Moreover, this convergence is monotonic:
investment it converges monotonically to i∗.
We can clarify the circumstances under which outside liquidity and investment are comple-
ments or substitutes. The equations in (4) can be rearranged to yield
i∗ = A(1+ r
∗)
1− ρ01+r∗
. (5)
It can be verified that i∗ increases with r∗ if and only if the following condition holds:
1
2
≥ ρ0
1+ r∗ . (6)
In Appendix A.1, we verify that r∗ increases with l. Hence, i∗ increases with l if and only if
i∗ increases with r∗ in equation (5), i.e. if and only if condition (6) holds. Given that r∗ is an
increasing function of outside liquidity l, this condition will hold if l is large enough.15 Let l0 be
the corresponding threshold. Clearly, l0 > 0 if and only if condition (6) is violated when l = 0
(in which case 1+ r∗ = ρ0/(1−ρ0)), i.e. if and only if 1/2< ρ0.
Proposition 2. In the bubble-free economy, steady-state interest rate r∗ increases with outside
liquidity. Steady-state investment i∗ increases with outside liquidity l when the interest rate is
high enough so that equation (6) is verified. More precisely, there exists l0 ≥ 0 such that for all
l ≥ 0, ∂i∗∂l is positive if and only if l is greater (smaller) than l0. Moreover, we have l0 > 0 if and
only if ρ0 < 1/2.
This proposition characterizes the situations where inside liquidity (investment) and outside
liquidity (trees) are complements or substitutes. When liquidity is abundant (l high), the price of
liquidity is low (the interest rate r∗ is high) and the liquidity effect outweighs the leverage effect
so that investment i∗ increases with l. An intuition for this result is that an increase in the interest
rate r∗ has a constant positive marginal effect on net worth at the time of investment A(1+ r∗)
but a decreasing negative marginal effect on leverage 1/[1−ρ0/(1+ r∗)].
2.3.4. The case l = 0. The case l = 0 proves to be an important benchmark to understand
the effects of bubbles. For this reason, we find it useful to highlight its properties even in the
bubble-free case. The bubble-free steady state is then i∗ = A/(1−ρ0) and 1+r∗ = ρ0/(1−ρ0).
In Appendix A.1, we show that whenever l > 0, the steady-state interest rate is higher so that
1+ r∗ > ρ0/(1−ρ0).
3. BUBBLES
In this section, we consider the possibility of rational bubbles. We first start by eliciting the
dynamics of the economy and the conditions for the existence of a bubbly steady state in Section
3.1. We show that there exists either zero or one bubbly steady state. This steady state features
higher investment than the bubble-free steady state. There are multiple competitive equilibria
corresponding to the same initial investment level i−1. For any initial investment level i−1, we
15. Indeed, r∗ goes to infinity as l goes to infinity as can be seen from eliminating i∗ in equation (4) or from
equation (A.6) in Appendix A.1.
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show that there exists a maximum feasible initial bubble bˉ(i−1). For b0 < bˉ(i−1), the economy
converges to the bubble-free steady state. For b0 = bˉ(i−1), the economy converges to the bubbly
steady state. Detailed derivations can be found in Appendix A.2 and its continuation in the
Online Appendix A.2.
3.1. Bubbly dynamics and steady state
In this section, we focus on the case where l > 0. We return to the case l = 0 at the end of the
section.
3.1.1. Dynamics. The economy is a two-dimensional dynamic system with state vari-
ables it−1 and bt . Given it−1 and bt , we now explain how it and bt+1 can be computed.
As can be seen from equation (3), a necessary condition for equilibrium is then that bt <
A. The asset supply equation (2) determines it as a decreasing function of rt+1 and the asset
demand equation (3) determines it as an increasing function of rt+1. As 1+rt+1 increases from
ρ0 to +∞, the supply curve decreases from +∞ to (l + bt + ρ0it−1) and the demand curve
increases from (A− bt − l/ρ0) to +∞. The unique intersection of these supply and demand
curves with (1+ rt+1) ∈ (ρ0,+∞) determines the values of it and rt+1. See Figure 1 for a
graphical illustration.
We can then infer the value of bt+1 from equation (1).16 We denote by it = 8i (it−1,bt ),
rt+1 = 8r (it−1,bt ), and bt+1 = 8b(it−1,bt ) the corresponding policy functions. In Appendix
A.2, we derive closed-form expressions for 8i (it−1,bt ), 8r (it−1,bt ), and 8b(it−1,bt ).
3.1.2. Bubbly steady state. There exists either zero or a unique bubbly steady state.
When a bubbly steady state exists, the values of i∗∗, b∗∗, and r∗∗ can be found by imposing
it = it−1= i∗∗, bt = b∗∗, and rt+1= r∗∗ = 0 in equations (2) and (3). See Figure 2 for a graphical
illustration.
When it exists, the bubbly steady state is given by
i∗∗ = A
1−ρ0 , b
∗∗ = A1−2ρ0
1−ρ0 − l, and r
∗∗ = 0.
The condition of existence of a bubbly steady state is
1−2ρ0
1−ρ0 >
l
A
. (B)
Condition (B) shows that bubbles can emerge when inside (ρ0) and outside (l) liquidity is scarce,
creating a high demand for assets. Moreover, the size of the bubble b∗∗ in the bubbly steady state
decreases with the fraction ρ0 of income that is pledgeable and with outside liquidity l: variations
in l are compensated one for one by variations in the size of the bubble. The interest rate r∗∗ is
pinned down at 0. As a result, investment i∗∗ at the bubbly steady state does not depend on l.
In Section 3.2, we show that condition (B) is equivalent to the standard condition that the
interest rate in the bubble-free steady state (r∗) be less than the rate of growth of the economy
(0). There, we also analyse the connection between dynamic efficiency and the condition for the
existence of bubbles.
16. This derivation assumes that ρ1 is large enough so that ρ1 > 1+rt+1. As stated above, we focus on equilibria
which verify this property.
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FIGURE 2
Asset supply and asset demand curves in steady state. The dotted curves represent the effects of an increase in l
(Section 2) or a shift from b∗ = 0 to b∗∗ > 0 (Section 3)
3.1.3. Phase diagram analysis. It will prove convenient to describe the dynamics that
we have just derived using a phase diagram. This requires characterizing the it = it−1 schedule—
the set of values (it−1,bt ) such that8i (it−1,bt )= it−1—and the bt+1 = bt schedule—the set of
values (it−1,bt ) such that 8b(it−1,bt )= bt .17
The it = it−1 schedule is given by
bt = i2t−1
ρ0(1−ρ0)
l
−ρ0it−1
A+ (2− 1
rho0
)
l
l
− l,
which defines a function bi (it−1). The bt+1 = bt schedule is given by
bt =−ρ20 it−1+ (1−ρ0)(A− l)−ρ0l,
which defines a function bb(it−1).
Lemma 1. Suppose that l > 0. The interest rate rt+1 = 8r (it−1,bt ) and investment it =
8i (it−1,bt ) are increasing in it−1 and bt . Investment it =8i (it−1,bt ) is greater (smaller) than
it−1 if and only if bt is greater (smaller) than bi (it−1). The bubble bt = 8b(it−1,bt ) is greater
(smaller) than bt−1 if and only if bt is greater (smaller) than bb(it−1).
The intuition for this lemma is simple: the presence of the bubble lowers the price of outside
liquidity or, in other words, increases the interest rate. This increases corporate net worth and
investment to the detriment of the suppliers of outside liquidity.
17. Note that bt+1 = bt = 0 whenever bt = 0. Literally speaking, the bt+1 = bt schedule consists of two parts:
the one characterized by bbt (it−1) which applies whenever bt > 0, and the line bt = 0; abusing terminology, we refer to
the former as the bt+1 = bt schedule.
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FIGURE 3
Phase diagram with positive outside liquidity
Figure 3 is a phase diagram representing the dynamics of the economy.18 The bubbly steady
state always features more investment than the bubble-free steady state. The latter is stable while
the former features a downward-sloping saddle path. If the economy starts on the saddle path,
it will eventually converge to the bubbly steady state. If it starts below the saddle path, it will
eventually converge to the bubble-free steady state. The economy cannot start above the saddle
path without eventually violating the constraint bt < A, which is a necessary condition for a
competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Assume that condition (B) holds and that l > 0. Then r∗ < 0 and i∗∗ > i∗. For
any i−1, there exists a maximum feasible bubble bˉ(i−1). The paths of productions/investments
{it }t≥0 and interest rates {rt }t≥0 are increasing in the size of the original bubble b0. For b0 <
bˉ(i−1), the economy is asymptotically bubble free: it converges to the bubble-free steady state.
For b0 = bˉ(i−1), the economy is asymptotically bubbly: it converges to the bubbly steady state.
Moreover, the function bˉ(i−1) is decreasing in i−1.
Remark 1. As is usual in rational bubbles models, our model features multiple equilibria. Ab-
sent additional structure, theory is agnostic as to equilibrium selection: it makes no prediction
as to which equilibrium is more likely to be observed.
We are now in a position to describe the dynamics when a bubble unexpectedly bursts. We
have in mind the following experiment. For t < t0, the economy evolves as a competitive equi-
librium {ı˜t , b˜t , r˜t }t≥0 with b˜t > 0 for all t . Then at t = t0, an unforeseen (zero probability) event
materializes which changes the conditions in the economy: for t ≥ t0, the economy evolves
according to the competitive equilibrium with initial conditions it0−1 = ı˜t0−1 and bt0 = 0. In
Section 4.2, we set up a sunspot model. The realization of the sunspot triggers a bubble crash.
18. We have bi (0)=−l < 0 and bb(0)= (1−ρ0)(A− l)−ρ0l which is strictly positive as long as condition (B)
holds. It is easy to verify that bi is increasing when it intersects bb . The sign of db
i
dit−1 |it−1=0, on the other hand, is
unclear a priori.
 at H
arvard U
niversity on M
arch 15, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
“rdr039” — 2012/4/17 — 12:28 — page 691 — #14
FARHI & TIROLE BUBBLY LIQUIDITY 691
We construct a rational expectations equilibrium which takes into account that the bubble has
a non-zero probability of crashing. The unexpected bubble burst that we consider here can be
thought of as a limit of the sunspot model when the probability that the sunspot variable materi-
alizes goes to zero.
Suppose e.g. that we are initially in the bubbly steady state ı˜t = i∗∗, b˜t = b∗∗, and r˜t =
r∗∗ = 0. When the bubble crashes at t = t0, the economy jumps downwards to the bt = 0 line.
Investment collapses, the interest rate decreases, and the economy gradually converges to the
bubble-free steady state.
3.1.4. The case l = 0. This analysis carries through to the case where l = 0. The only dif-
ference is that the it = it−1 schedule becomes vertical at i∗. Investment dynamics are unaffected
by the existence of a bubble
it = A+ρ0it−1.
The reason is that the sum of the value of the securities issued by the middle-aged generation,
ρ0it/(1+rt+1), and the bubble bt in the end is equal to the savings A of the young generation. Put
differently, the bubble fully crowds out the value of the assets produced by previous generations
of entrepreneurs. Its only effect is to increase the rate of interest as
bt + ρ0it1+ rt+1 = A.
Similarly, the bubbly steady state (if it exists) features the same investment level as the bubble-
free steady state i∗∗ = i∗ = A/(1−ρ0). At a steady state, the bubble simply increases the interest
rate.19
3.2. Tests for bubbles and dynamic efficiency
To discuss efficiency, we first need a metric to index the welfare of the original holders of trees
in every period. We take the utility of the original holders of date-t trees to be (any increas-
ing function of) the amount of resources that they receive from selling their trees. This is the
right concept in the example we gave for the supply of outside liquidity with one-period-lived
consumers in Section 2.
In our model, dynamic efficiency and Pareto efficiency are equivalent concepts and we there-
fore use the two terms interchangeably in what follows. An allocation is dynamically efficient
if there is no other resource-feasible allocation that increases the lifetime utility of some agent
without reducing that of another. Note that in this definition, the pledgeability constraints are
deliberately ignored.
If an allocation is not dynamically efficient, we can ask whether it satisfies a weaker notion
of efficiency which we refer to as constrained dynamic efficiency: an allocation is constrained
dynamically efficient if there is no other resource-feasible allocation that increases the lifetime
utility of some agent without reducing that of another, which satisfies the pledgeability con-
straints that require that the consumption of old entrepreneurs at date t exceed (ρ1−ρ0) times
19. Woodford (1990) shows that the introduction of bubbles always crowds investment in, starting in a situation
where there are neither outside stores of value (l = 0) nor inside stores of value (ρ0 = 0). Because ρ0 = 0, his model
assumes away leverage effects. As we show here, with ρ0 > 0, bubbles have no effect on investment if l = 0. There is a
discountinuity at ρ0 = 0. See Appendix A.3 for a detailed discussion.
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the amount of resources that were invested at date t−1. Actually, we will show that competitive
equilibria of our economy, when they are not dynamically efficient, are also not constrained
dynamically efficient.
Determining whether an allocation is dynamically efficient is a simple task: when the
pledgeability constraints are ignored, our economy is a simple overlapping generations economy
with a linear investment technology with rate of return ρ1. The following proposition demon-
strates that the efficiency of the allocations that satisfy Definition 1 of a competitive equilibrium
(and this definition does incorporate pledgeability constraints) hinges on the value ρ1.
Proposition 4. If ρ1> 1, all competitive equilibria of our economy with or without bubbles are
dynamically efficient. If ρ1 < 1, no competitive equilibrium is constrained dynamically efficient.
Note that dynamic inefficiency (ρ1 < 1) implies that r∗ < 0. However, r∗ < 0 is compati-
ble with dynamic efficiency (ρ1 > 1). Interest rates below the growth rate of the economy are
compatible with dynamic efficiency because the interest rate reflects the fraction of the return
on investment which is pledgeable to outside investors and not the total return on investment.
Indeed, the paths for investment and the interest rate do not depend on the total return on invest-
ment ρ1 (as long as ρ1 > 1+rt for all t) but only on the pledgeable part of this return ρ0. In sum,
r∗ < 0 is a necessary but not sufficient condition for dynamic inefficiency.
Abel et al. (1989)’s test remains valid in our model as a test of dynamic efficiency, but it
does not directly address the possibility of bubbles: dynamic inefficiency is a sufficient but
not necessary condition for the possibility of bubbles. In contrast, the possibility of bubbles—
condition (B)—is still determined by the interest rate test r∗ ≤ 0.
Proposition 5. The possibility of bubbles is exactly determined by an (uninformed investor)
interest rate test of the form r∗ ≤ 0.
At the bubbly steady state, the interest rate r∗∗ is equal to 0. Therefore, at a steady state, one
can test for the possibility of bubbles by comparing the interest rate with the rate of growth of
the economy, without taking a view as to whether or not the economy is at the bubble-free or
bubbly steady state.
The validity of Abel et al. (1989)’s test to detect dynamic efficiency is most easily illustrated
by applying it to steady states. Indeed, consider a (bubbly or bubble-free) steady state (i,b) ∈
{(i∗,0), (i∗∗,b∗∗)}. The test involves three quantities: the value of resources ρ1i produced in
every period, the resources i used for investment, and the value of the market portfolio ρ0i . It
states that the economy is dynamically efficient (inefficient) if and only if the difference between
the resources produced and the resources used of investment normalized by the value of the
market portfolio (ρ1i − i)/(ρ0i) is strictly positive (negative), i.e. if and only if ρ1 is greater
(smaller) than 1, exactly as prescribed by Proposition 4.
The considerations brought about by our analysis go part of the way towards rehabilitating
interest rate tests as an indication for the possibility of bubbles. They shed light on which interest
rate should be used in these tests: this rate corresponds to an interest rate available to outside
investors—a relatively low interest rate such as the interest rate on riskless bonds.
3.3. Summary
Figure 4 allows for a concise summary of the dependence on outside liquidity l of the bubbly
and bubble-free steady states. The figure displays investment i∗ at the bubble-free steady state as
a function of outside liquidity l. We denote this function by i∗(l). We also use the notation r∗(l)
 at H
arvard U
niversity on M
arch 15, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
“rdr039” — 2012/4/17 — 12:28 — page 693 — #16
FARHI & TIROLE BUBBLY LIQUIDITY 693
FIGURE 4
Comparing (i∗∗,r∗∗) and (i∗,r∗)
to denote the interest rate in the bubble-free steady state. The figure also represents investment
at the bubble-free steady state when l < 0. This case will be covered later in Section 5.1. For
now, we focus on the part of the figure that corresponds to l ≥ 0.
The function i∗(l) reaches a minimum on [0,+∞) at the threshold l0 ≥ 0. In Proposition 2,
we showed that l0 > 0 if and only if ρ0 < 1/2. The left panel illustrates the case where ρ0 < 1/2
(and hence l0 > 0) and the right panel illustrates the case where ρ0 > 1/2 (and hence l0 = 0).
When ρ0 > 1/2, liquidity always crowds investment in: i∗(l) is increasing in l for all l ≥ 0.
For all values l ≥ 0, condition (B) is violated, and hence bubbles cannot arise.
In the rest of this section, we assume that ρ0 < 1/2, liquidity crowds investment in (out) if
and only if l ≥ l0 (l < l0): i∗(l) decreases in l on [0, l0] and increases in l on [l0,∞). There is
always a value l∗∗ ≡ A(1−2ρ0)/(1−ρ0) > 0 such that i∗(l∗∗)= i∗(0).
Condition (B) holds, and hence bubbles can arise, if and only if 0 ≤ l ≤ l∗∗. At the
bubbly steady state, variations in l are compensated one for one by variations in the size of
the bubble since b∗∗ = A(1−2ρ0)/(1−ρ0)− l. As a result, investment i∗∗ = A/(1−ρ0) at the
bubbly steady state does not depend on l. Importantly, investment at the bubbly steady state is
always equal to investment at the bubble-free steady state when l = 0: i∗∗ = i∗(0).
When l = l∗∗, investment is at the same level in the bubble-free and bubbly steady states:
i∗(l∗∗) = i∗∗ = i(0). Moreover, the gross interest rate is equal to zero in the bubble-free steady
state 1+ r∗(l∗∗) = 0, and the value of the bubble in the bubbly steady state is b∗∗ = 0. For
0< l < l∗∗, investment is strictly higher in the bubbly steady state than in the bubble-free steady
state i∗∗ = i∗(0) > i∗(l). For 0≤ l < l∗∗, the gross interest rate at the bubble-free steady state is
strictly negative (1+ r∗(l) < 0) and the size of the bubble at the bubbly steady state is given by
b∗∗ = l∗∗ − l > 0.
All in all, bubbles, when they are possible, always restore investment to the steady-state
level corresponding to both l = 0 and l = l∗∗: i∗∗ = i∗(0)= i∗(l∗∗). When bubbles are possible,
investment at the bubble-free steady state i∗(l) initially decreases as outside liquidity increases
from l = 0 to l = l0. Investment at the bubble-free steady state i∗(l) then increases as outside
liquidity increases from l = l0 to l∗∗ and reaches i∗(l∗∗) = i(0). For all 0 < l < l∗∗, we have
i∗(l) < i∗∗ = i(0)= i(l∗∗). For l > l∗∗, bubbles cease to be possible.
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4. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
4.1. Collateral heterogeneity
We have assumed so far for simplicity that firms are homogeneous (perhaps up to a scaling
factor). When firms differ, say, in the pledgeability of their income, those with limited access
to unsophisticated investors, i.e. low ρ0 firms (family firms, private equity, startups), benefit
relatively more from the presence of a bubble. They enjoy the liquidity effect without being
much impacted by the leverage effect. Conversely, they also suffer more from a bubble crash.
Let k be an index for firms and let ρk0 be an increasing function of k. We can assume without
loss of generality that k is distributed uniformly on [0,1]. We denote by i kt the investment of firm
k in period t : each firm’s investment is potentially different since they differ in their ability to
generate pledgeable income ρk0 i
k
t from investment. Importantly, all firms have the same initial net
worth A, and hence the same wealth bt + l+
∫
ρk0 i
k
t−1dk when middle-aged, so that investment
by firm k is
i kt =
bt + l+
∫
ρk0 i
k
t−1dk
1− ρk01+rt+1
. (7)
We then have the following aggregation result. The economy is described by two state vari-
ables: the value of the bubble bt and the integral
∫
ρk0 i
k
t−1dk describing the total value of the ex-
isting stock of securities. The law of motion for bt is still bt+1 = bt (1+rt+1), while
∫
ρk0 i
k
t−1dk
and rt+1 are jointly determined as the intersection of the aggregate supply and the demand curves
for assets20 ∫
ρk0 i
k
t dk =
∫ ρk0
1− ρk01+rt+1
dk
(bt + l+∫ ρk0 i kt−1dk) (8)
and ∫
ρk0 i
k
t dk = [A(1+ rt+1)− l− (1+ rt+1)bt ]. (9)
There exists either zero or a unique bubbly steady state. When a bubbly steady state exists, the
values of
∫
ρk0 i
∗∗kdk and b∗∗ can be found by imposing
∫
ρk0 i
k
t dk =
∫
ρk0 i
k
t−1dk =
∫
ρk0 i
∗∗kdk,
bt = b∗∗, and rt+1 = r∗∗ = 0 in equations (8) and (9). Investment i∗∗k by firm k can then be
computed using equation (7). We then have
i∗∗k = A
1−ρk0
, b∗∗ =
(∫ 1−2ρk0
1−ρk0
dk
)
A− l, and r∗∗ = 0.
The condition for a bubble to exist is now given by(∫ 1−2ρk0
1−ρk0
dk
)
>
l
A
. (B′)
The analysis of the dynamics of the economy is exactly as in Section 3.1. Replacing the repre-
sentative firm’s pledgeable income by the industry-average pledgeable income, we see that the
previous analysis generalizes to heterogenous firms.
20. Equations (8) and (9) are the same as equations (2) and (3) replacing ρ0it with
∫
ρk0 i
k
t dk and
ρ0
1−ρ0/(1+rt+1)
by
∫
ρk0
1−ρk0/(1+ rt+1)
dk.
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The relative size of firms with low pledgeable income increases when bubbles arise and
decreases when bubbles crash. Taking derivatives in equation (7),
dikt
i kt dbt
= ∂i
k
t
i kt ∂bt
+ ∂i
k
t
i kt ∂rt+1
drt+1
dbt
= 1
bt + l+
∫
ρk0 i
k
t−1dk
− ρ
k
0
(1+ rt+1−ρk0 )2
drt+1
dbt
.
We can also analyse the consequences of an unexpected (zero probability) bubble crash of the
form discussed in Section 3.1. There are two immediate opposing effects on investment: (a) firms
which used the bubble to hoard liquidity have less net worth and (b) the interest rate decreases,
which allows for more leverage. The percentage decrease in investment resulting from a lower
net worth is independent of ρk0 . The percentage increase in investment from a higher leverage is
higher, the higher the pledgeable income ρk0 . As a result, in relative terms, the size of firms with
low pledgeable income compared to the size of firms with high pledgeable income decreases
when a bubble crashes.
Proposition 6. Assume that condition (B′) holds and that l > 0. Then
(i) for any value of ∫ ρk0 i k−1dk, there exists a maximum feasible bubble bˉ (∫ ρk0 i k−1dk) . The
path of interest rates {rt }t≥0 is increasing in the size of the initial bubble b0; the path of
productions/investments {it }t≥0 is increasing in the size of the initial bubble b0 . For b0 <
bˉ
(∫
ρk0 i
k
−1dk
)
, the economy is asymptotically bubble free: it converges monotonically
to the bubble-free steady state. For b0 = bˉ
(∫
ρk0 i
k
−1dk
)
, the economy is asymptotically
bubbly: it converges monotonically to the bubbly steady state;
(ii) the equilibrium paths for {bt }t≥0 and {rt }t≥0 are increasing in the size b0 of the initial
bubble;
(iii) the relative size of firms with low pledgeable income (low ρk0 ) compared to the size of
firms with high pledgeable income (high ρk0 ) increases with the size of the initial bubble
b0: the relative variation (i kt )−1dikt /db0 of investment ikt at date t+1 with respect to the
initial bubble b0 is decreasing in k.
4.2. Stochastic bubbles (1): bubbly liquidity premium
As inWeil (1987), we can allow the bubble to burst stochastically depending on the realization of
a sunspot. Suppose that each period the bubble bursts with probability 1−λ. An asset’s liquidity
service depends on what the asset delivers when cash is particularly valuable to firms. Building
on this idea, we now argue that, even in this risk-neutral environment, a stochastic bubble trades
at a liquidity discount or equivalently a risk premium relative to riskless stores of value. We
focus on the case l > 0.
Let it and rt+1 (respectively, i−t and r−t+1) denote the investment levels and interest rates
when the bubble has lasted until period t + 1 and continues (respectively, bursts). The asset
supply equations are given by
it = bt + l+ρ0it−11− ρ01+rt+1
and i−t =
l+ρ0it−1
1− ρ01+r−t+1
.
Similarly, the asset demand equations are given by
it = A(1+ rt+1)− l− (1+ rt+1)bt
ρ0
and i−t =
A(1+ r−t+1)− l
ρ0
.
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Since i−t and r−t+1 are determined by the same set of equations as it and rt+1 but with bt = 0,
it is clear that rt+1 > r−t+1: the burst of the bubble depresses the interest rate. The immediate
response of investment it to a bubble crash is determined by Lemmas 1 and 3 (Online Appendix):
as long as l > 0, the burst of the bubble depresses investment so that it > i−t (it = i−t when l = 0).
At date t , generation-t entrepreneurs can hold safe assets (trees, claims on previous in-
vestments’ income) or risky ones (stochastic bubble). Letting r˜t denote the return on the bub-
ble when it does not burst: bt = (1+ r˜t )bt−1 if the bubble does not burst and bt = 0 other-
wise. By investing one in a tree at t , an entrepreneur can secure 1+ rt at t + 1, which al-
lows him to invest (1+ rt )/[1− ρ0/(1+ rt+1)] at t + 1 if the bubble does not crash at t + 1
and (1+ rt )/[1− ρ0/(1+ r−t+1)] if it crashes. This allows him to consume (ρ1− ρ0)(1+ rt )/
[1− ρ0/(1+ rt+1)] at t + 2 if the bubble does not crash at t + 1 and (ρ1− ρ0)(1+ rt )/[1−
ρ0/(1+ r−t+1)] if it crashes. Similarly, investing one in the bubble at t delivers 1+ r˜t at t + 1 if
the bubble does not crash at t + 1 and zero if it crashes. This allows the entrepreneur to invest
(1+ r˜t )/[1−ρ0/(1+ rt+1)] at t + 1 if the bubble does not crash at t + 1 and zero if it crashes.
This allows him to consume (ρ1−ρ0)(1+ r˜t )/[1−ρ0/(1+rt+1)] at t+2 if the bubble does not
crash at t + 1 and zero if it crashes. In equilibrium, expected consumption at t + 2 from these
two investment options at t must be equalized. This leads to the following arbitrage equation
between bubbles and trees:
λ
1+ rt
1− ρ01+rt+1
+ (1−λ) 1+ rt
1− ρ01+r−t+1
= λ 1+ r˜t
1− ρ01+rt+1
. (10)
This in turn implies that 1+ r˜t > (1+rt )/λ. Despite risk neutrality, stochastic bubbles feature
a liquidity premium: they command positive net excess returns λ(1+ r˜t )−(1+rt ). The intuition
is straightforward. Bubbles deliver no return when internal wealth is the most valuable: when
liquidity is scarce, interest rates are low and internal funds can be levered a lot.
There are multiple equilibria with such stochastic bubble, exactly as in our baseline model.
There exists a unique conditional bubbly steady state: a competitive equilibrium such that the
variables (it ,bt ) are constant and equal to (i∗∗,b∗∗) with b∗∗ > 0 until the sunspot variable
realizes and the bubble crashes. At such a conditional steady state, the bubble is constant (until
it crashes) and hence 1+ r˜∗∗ = 1. Moreover,
1+ r∗∗ =
(
1+ 1−λ
λ
1− ρ01+r∗∗
1− ρ01+r∗∗−
)−1
,
l+ρ0 A+l
r∗∗
1+r∗∗
1−ρ0
1− ρ01+r∗∗−
= A(1+ r
∗∗−)− l
ρ0
,
i∗∗ = A+ l
r∗∗
1+r∗∗
1−ρ0 , and b
∗∗ = A+ l
r∗∗
1+r∗∗
1−ρ0
(
1− ρ0
1+ r∗∗ −ρ0
)
− l.
The condition for the existence of a bubble becomes21
1− ρ01+r∗∗ −ρ0
1−ρ0 >
[
1
1+ lA r
∗∗
1+r∗∗
]
l
A
. (B′′)
21. Unfortunately, this condition determines only implicitly the parameter region that leads to the possibility of
bubbles. It features an endogenous object r∗∗. This complication arises for the following reason. Bubbles now present a
risk premium and thus a positive net excess return: λ(1+ r˜∗∗)− (1+r∗∗) > 0. In a conditional bubbly steady state, zero
bubble growth pins down the expected return on bubbles: 1+ r˜∗∗ = 1, but the risk-free rate r∗∗ has to be determined
jointly with r∗∗− as solutions to a non-linear system.
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This condition is more likely to be verified, the higher r∗∗ is. It coincides with condition (B)
when r∗∗ = 0. Note that we necessarily have (1+r∗∗)/λ < 1+ r˜∗∗ = 1 so that r∗∗ < λ−1< 0.
As a result, condition (B′′) is more stringent than condition (B).
Proposition 7. Suppose that condition (B′′) holds and that l > 0, then
(i) in any competitive equilibrium with a strictly positive bubble, before the bubble bursts,
the bubble features a liquidity premium;
(ii) in any competitive equilibrium with a strictly positive bubble, the bursting of the bubble
decreases interest rates: firms scramble for collateral, which becomes more valuable;
(iii) in any competitive equilibrium, when the bubble bursts, investment immediately decreases;
then, the economy gradually converges to the bubble-free steady state;
(iv) in the conditional bubbly steady state—before the bubble bursts—as the probability of
bursting (1−λ) increases, the interest rate r∗∗ and the bubble b∗∗ decrease; investment
i∗∗ decreases;
(v) in the conditional bubbly steady state, interest rates and investment are high (r∗∗ > r∗
and i∗∗ > i∗).
For example, when l > 0, steady-state investment i∗∗, bubble size b∗∗, and interest rate r∗∗
all decrease in the probability 1−λ that the bubble crashes. A more stable bubble provides more
liquidity and is more conducive to investment. This in turn boosts the demand for liquidity and
makes for a larger bubble.
A full characterization of the dynamics is outside the scope of this paper. Indeed, an extra
state variable is required to describe the economy. The state space is now given by the triple
(it−1,bt ,rt ). The reason past interest rates rt have to be kept track of is that the arbitrage equation
(10) involves both the interest rate at date t and at date t + 1. As a consequence, simple two-
dimensional phase diagrams cannot be used anymore. A full characterization of the stability
properties of the different steady states and their basin of attraction is rather involved and outside
the scope of this paper.
Remark 2. Imagine that there is a stochastic bubble in an economy with heterogeneity in
pledgeable income as in Section 4.1. Equation (10) has the implication that firms with higher
ρk0 will demand a higher expected return to hold the bubble: they are more affected by the
double whammy associated with a bubble crash (the loss of wealth at the moment when lev-
ering up is attractive). Therefore, in equilibrium, the bubble will be held by the firms with the
lowest ρk0 .
22 When l > 0, we showed in Proposition 6 that for a given portfolio, these firms
are also the firms whose investment decreases the most in percentage terms when the bubble
crashes. The result is an amplification mechanism whereby the equilibrium allocation of the
bubble across firms magnifies the impact of a crash. In equilibrium, firms with a high ρk0 do not
hold the bubble so that their net worth is insulated from the bubble crash. Moreover, they can
increase their leverage more than firms with a low ρk0 in response to the drop in interest rates
that follows the crash of the bubble. Conversely, firms with a low ρk0 hold the bubble so that
their net worth is impaired when the bubble crashes. In addition, their leverage increases less
than firms with a high ρk0 in response to the drop in interest rates that follows the crash of the
bubble.
22. Interestingly, the recent real estate crash did affect many highly levered financial institutions. The prospect
of a public bailout (more likely for levered financial institutions), however, is not part of our competitive equilibrium
modelling.
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4.3. Stochastic bubbles (2): endogenous crashes
Following up on Section (4.2), we modify the environment in the following way. Suppose that
A follows a two-state Markov process A ∈ {AH , AL} with AH > AL . Initially A = AH . With
probability 1−λ > 0 per period, A transitions to AL which is an absorbing state.
We assume that condition (B′′) is verified for an exogenous bursting probability (1−λ) in
an economy with a deterministic and constant A equal to AH . Similarly, we assume that for any
λ ∈ [0,1], condition (B) is violated in an economy with a deterministic and constant A equal
to AL . Hence, if the economy is already in the state of low net worth A = AL , the demand for
liquidity is low, the interest rate is high, and bubbles cannot exist. Bubbles, however, can exist
as long as net worth is high: A = AH .
Suppose that At = AH and consider the economy entering period t + 1 with state variables
given by (bt , it−1,rt ). Then if At+1 = AH , (bt+1, it ,rt+1) are given by the same equations as in
Section 4.2 with A = AH . On the other hand, if At+1 = AL , then the bubble bursts: bt = 0 and
it are given by the same equations as above with A= AL and bt = 0. The economy then evolves
as in Section 2.2.
Proposition 8. Assume that condition (B′′) holds with A = AH but that condition (B) is vio-
lated with A = AL. Consider an economy where in the initial period the economy is in steady
state along the bubbly path and At = AH . In the first period where At = AL , the bubble bursts.
Then the economy converges to the bubble-free steady state corresponding to A = AL.
The mechanics of a bubble crash are similar to those of the previous section. The difference
is that in Section 4.2, the burst of the bubble was triggered by the realization of a pure sunspot
variable. Here, by contrast, the burst of the bubble is triggered by an adverse fundamental shock
to initial net worth A of entrepreneurs. When this shock occurs, the demand for liquidity drops
enough that bubbles are not feasible anymore.
This environment makes clear that when l > 0, bad shocks to corporate balance sheets can
potentially have an amplified negative effect on investment over and above that described in the
literature emphasizing the importance of corporate net worth—e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)—by triggering liquidity dry-ups in the form of bubble bursts.
5. DISCUSSION AND ROBUSTNESS
5.1. Negative outside liquidity
We now assume that net outside liquidity l is negative. This can be motivated by imagining
that there is a demand for outside liquidity from an unmodelled part of the economy (another
group of consumers or foreigners) who demand liquidity in excess of the supply of trees. This is
relevant in light of the recent literature on the “global savings glut” (see for example Bernanke,
2005; Caballero et al., 2008a,b). We develop some of these ideas in Section 5.3.
We focus on steady states. Detailed derivations, as well as an analysis of the dynamics, can
be found in Appendices A.1, A.2, and A.4.
5.1.1. Steady states. There is a unique bubble-free steady state which corresponds to the
intersection of the bt = 0 locus with it = it−1≥ 0; this steady state is always stable.23 If condition
(B) holds, there are two intersections between the it = it−1 and the bt+1 = bt schedules such
23. We have bi (0)=−l > 0 and bb(0)= (1−ρ0)(A− l)which is strictly positive as long as condition (B) holds.
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that bt > 0. The corresponding investment levels are given by −l(1−ρ0)/ρ0 and A/(1−ρ0).
As long as the following condition is satisfied, the lowest solution corresponds to an unstable
bubbly steady state and the highest solution to a saddle-path-stable bubbly steady state
− l
A
<
ρ0
(1−ρ0)2 . (11)
Condition (11) is more likely to be verified; the lower the net demand −l for outside liquidity,
the higher the level of pledgeable income ρ0 and the higher the net worth of entrepreneurs A.
We maintain it throughout this section.
Proposition 9. Suppose that l < 0, then
(i) r∗ increases with l; steady state investment i∗ increases with l when the interest rate is
high enough so that equation (6) is verified; more precisely, there exists l˜0 such that for
all l, ∂i∗∂l > 0 if and only if l > l˜0; moreover, we have l˜0 > 0 if and only if ρ0 < 1/2;(ii) suppose that condition (B) and equation (11) hold, then investment at the bubbly steady
state is lower than investment at the bubble-free steady state i∗∗ = A/(1−ρ0) < i∗;
(iii) suppose that equation (11) holds, then the results in Propositions 4 and 5 extend to the
case l < 0.
The first part of the proposition focuses on the question of whether outside liquidity crowds
investment in or out at the bubble-free steady state. This result generalizes that of Proposition 2:
outside liquidity crowds investment in when outside liquidity is abundant enough.
The second part of the proposition focuses on the question of whether bubbles crowd invest-
ment in or out by comparing the bubble-free and bubbly steady states. Bubbles always increase
interest rates, which reduces the value of the trees. When l > 0, the non-corporate sector is
a net seller of trees. The bubble then operates a transfer from the non-corporate sector to the
corporate sector, which increases investment. Bubbles and investment are complements. When
l < 0, the opposite happens and bubbles crowd investment out. Bubbles and investment are then
substitutes. Figure 4 provides a convenient summary.
The third part of the Proposition shows that both our efficiency results in Proposition 5 and
our results for the interest rate test to infer the possibility of bubbles in Proposition 4 generalize
to the case l < 0.
Remark 3. Entrepreneurs’ preferences were chosen such that they save their entire endow-
ment when young and invest all the resulting wealth when middle-aged. The Online Appendix
A.4 relaxes this assumption and allows more flexibility in the entrepreneurs’ savings/dissavings
choices. It turns out that the results obtained in this paper carry over with the one following
caveat. Once we allow for flexibility in the entrepreneurs savings/dissavings choices, it is still
true that bubbles boost investment when outside liquidity l exceeds some threshold; this thresh-
old need not be equal to zero and instead may either be positive or negative.
5.2. Public debt as outside liquidity
In a non-Ricardian environment, public debt can be a form of outside liquidity. Indeed, imagine
that there are consumers who live for one period, receive incomew. Imagine that the government
taxes a portion l˜ <w of their income and issues bonds one period ahead that are claims on the tax
proceeds l˜. Let π be the number of newly born consumers per newly born entrepreneur. At date
t , the government receives l˜π/(1+rt+1) from the bond issuance and distributes it to consumers.
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Then l = l˜π . By issuing debt and redeeming it by taxing newly born consumers, the government
is able to increase the supply of outside liquidity.
As long as 1+ rt+1 > 1, this policy makes consumers worse off. However, when condi-
tion (B) holds so that bubbles are possible, the government can issue debt and constantly roll it
over without ever raising taxes: the bubble and government debt become isomorphic. Hence, a
possible reinterpretation of the model is that the bubble is government debt. Under this interpre-
tation, when liquidity is scarce—condition (B) holds—the government can increase the supply
of outside liquidity at no cost to the government budget (without ever having to raise taxes).
5.3. Interest-rate sensitive outside liquidity
In this section, we provide some other micro-foundations for outside liquidity. In these other
foundations, l decreases with the interest rate. We show how to extend some of our most impor-
tant results to this more general case.
5.3.1. Unconstrained firms. Suppose that there also exists a competitive fringe of firms
operating a concave production function f (kt ). These firms are owned by consumers who only
consume when young. Consumers then sell the firms to investors for a price f (kt )/(1+rt )−kt ,
where kt is the equilibrium investment level. In equilibrium, it will be the case that f ′(kt ) =
1+ rt so that kt = k(rt ), where k is decreasing in rt . This creates a net positive supply of trees
lt = l(rt )≡ f (k(rt )).
5.3.2. Consumers as borrowers and securitization. Suppose that consumers have con-
cave preferences and hence an elastic borrowing margin. They live for two periods and have
preferences given by
u(cy)+βu(co),
where cy and co denote, respectively, consumption when young and old. They earn income wy
when young and wo when old. To simplify the analysis, we focus on the case of log preferences
where u(c)= log(c). In this case, consumers of generation t , facing interest rate rt , consume
c
y
t =
1
1+β
(
wy+ w
o
1+ rt
)
and cot =
β
1+β ((1+ rt )w
y+wo).
The supply of trees from the consumers’ sector is therefore
lt = l(rt )≡ wo− β1+β ((1+ rt )w
y+wo),
where l(rt ) is decreasing with rt .
In this analysis, consumers do not face collateral constraints when they borrow. In practice,
they often do; furthermore, the institutions that determine the extent to which claims on con-
sumers’ future income can be transformed into stores of value have high policy relevance.24
24. Suppose that consumers have some endowment of goods w—labour income—in their youth. They use that
labour income to build a house, which has total value y1 jt at period t + 1, where jt is the home investment realized
in period t . However, suppose only a fraction y0 jt < y1 jt can be collateralized. Consumers can invest up to w/[1−
y0/(1+ rt )] in housing. Consumers thus create lt = l(rt ) additional stores of values for the corporate sector where
l(rt ) ≡ y0w/[1− y0/(1+ rt )]. An increase in securitization—in the form of mortgage backed securities e.g.—can be
formalized as an increase in y0 towards y1 and materializes as an increase in lt . In this micro-foundation, the amount of
trees l(rt ) is again endogenous as it decreases with the interest rate.
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5.3.3. Generalizing the analysis to interest-sensitive outside liquidity. Let us now
analyse a framework that encompasses all the examples mentioned above. There is a net supply
of assets owned by another sector of the economy (which we call the consumers’ sector) in the
amount lt = l(rt ), where l is decreasing in rt .
The supply and demand equations for assets are now given by
it = lt +bt +ρ0it−11− ρ01+rt+1
and it = A(1+ rt+1)− lt+1− (1+ rt+1)bt
ρ0
.
The dynamics of this economy are harder to analyse because the endogeneity of lt imposes to
keep track of an additional state variable in addition to it−1 and bt : the past level of the interest
rate rt . However, the steady-state analysis remains very tractable. In the bubbly steady state
i∗∗ = A
1−ρ0 , b
∗∗ = A1−2ρ0
1−ρ0 − l(0), and r
∗∗ = 0.
Note that investment in the bubbly steady state is independent of the function l(rt ). There is
perfect crowding out between bubbles and trees: b∗∗ + l(0) is independent of the function l(rt )
away from zero interest rates.
The condition for the bubbly steady state becomes
A
1−2ρ0
1−ρ0 − l(0) > 0. (B
′′′)
We continue to denote investment and the interest rate that prevail at the bubble-free steady state
by i∗ and r∗.
Proposition 10. Suppose that condition (B′′′) holds. Then the interest rate at the bubble-free
steady state is negative: r∗ < 0.
(i) If l(r∗) > 0, investment in the bubbly steady state i∗∗ is higher than investment i∗ in the
bubble-free steady state.
(ii) If l(r∗) < 0 and − 1−ρ0ρ0 l(r∗) < A1−ρ0 , investment in the bubbly steady state i∗∗ is lower
than investment i∗ in the bubble-free steady state.
Remark 4. In the model with unconstrained firms, we have l(r∗)= f (k∗) > 0. Proposition 10
then shows that i∗∗ > i∗. However, note that the steady-state investment level for unconstrained
firms in a bubbly steady state is lower than that in the non-bubbly steady state: k∗∗ < k∗. This
is the standard crowding-out effect of bubbles on investment emphasized in Tirole (1985) in
the context of the model of Diamond (1965). Therefore, bubbles crowd in the investment of
constrained firms (i∗∗ > i∗) but crowd out the investment of unconstrained firms (k∗∗ < k∗).
6. CONCLUSION
This paper suggests a number of promising research avenues. Three themes seem to us particu-
larly interesting. First, we have only briefly touched in Section 4.2 on the question of who should
hold the bubble. There we saw that a stochastic bubble is held in equilibrium by the firms with
the lowest pledgeable income. To explore the ownership question further, one could e.g. allow
less levered agents such as consumers to hold the bubble. Second, our model is too stylized to
analyse the specific role of monetary policy or the interaction between prudential regulation and
interest rate policy; developing the model along this dimension would be interesting. Third, it
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would be worth introducing the possibility of bailouts. In Farhi and Tirole (2012), we investi-
gate this question and point out that systemic bailouts (e.g. through lax interest rate policy in
response to a crisis) result in strategic complementarities in liquidity and portfolio choices. The
financial institutions’ incentive to correlate their positions on the overvalued assets would have
implications for macrodynamics and public debt.
Our analysis has been deliberately theoretical. Its implications for public policy require fur-
ther thought and extensions. Economies recurrently generate cycles of asset price overvaluations,
credit booms, and, when bubbles burst, recessions. Potential applications to the measurement of
capital adequacy abound. For example, asset price overvaluation and crashes are closely related
to the policy debates on pro-cyclical regulation, fair value accounting, and deleveraging in busts.
Similarly, an analysis of the link between bubbles and the scarcity of liquidity can shed light on
public policies controlling the supply of outside liquidity, e.g. by adjusting the level of public
debt or by tightening or relaxing securitization standards. Finally, this type of analysis can shed
light on the link between bubbles and financial development.25 Our stance that policy impli-
cations lie outside the scope of our paper should not obscure the potential fruitfulness of such
policy investigations.
APPENDIX A
A.1. Proofs for Section 2
Although we focus on the case l ≥ 0 in the text, the derivations in this section are also valid when l < 0. We make use of
some of these results when we turn to the case l < 0 in Section 5.1.
Derivation of the closed-form expressions for the policy functions8i ,8r , and 8b in the bubble-free case. Assume
that bt = 0. The system of two equations (equations (2) and (3)) in the two unknowns (it ,rt+1) can be solved as follows.
Using equation (3) to find an expression for rt+1 and replacing this expression in equation (2), we are led to the following
quadratic equation:
i2t −
[
A+ρ0it−1− l
(
1
ρ0
−1
)]
it − l(l+ρ0it−1)
ρ0
. (A.1)
Given a solution to this equation, we can then compute the associated interest rate 1+ rt+1 = (ρ0it + l)/A. The only
solution of equation (A.1) with it ≥ 0 and an associated interest rate such that 1+ rt+1 ≥ ρ0 is given by
it =
A+ρ0it−1−
(
1
ρ0
−1
)
l+
√[
A+ρ0it−1−
(
1
ρ0
−1
)
l
]2+4 lρ0 (l+ρ0it−1)
2
. (A.2)
Using the asset demand equation (3) we can compute the associated interest rate
1+ rt+1 = ρ0
A+ρ0it−1+
(
1+ 1ρ0
)
l+
√[
A+ρ0it−1−
(
1
ρ0
−1
)
l
]2+4 lρ0 (l+ρ0it−1)
2(A−bt ) . (A.3)
Derivation of the bubble-free steady state. A steady state (i∗,r∗) of the bubble-free economy solves
i∗ = l+ρ0i
∗
1− ρ01+r∗
and i∗ = A(1+ r
∗)− l
ρ0
.
This yields the following quadratic equation in i∗ :
i∗2(1−ρ0)− i∗
[
A+ l−
(
1
ρ0
−1
)
l
]
− l
2
ρ0
= 0. (A.4)
25. Financial development in our model is captured by the quality of governance (ρ0) and the existing stock of
traded securities (ρ0it−1).
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This equation has two solutions. When l 6= 0, one of these solutions is strictly negative and the other one is strictly
positive. The strictly positive solution is given by
i∗ =
(A+ l)−
(
1
ρ0
−1
)
l+
√[
(A+ l)−
(
1
ρ0
−1
)
l
]2+4 l2ρ0 (1−ρ0)
2(1−ρ0) . (A.5)
Using 1+ r∗ = (ρ0i∗ + l)/A, we can compute the associated interest rate r∗
1+ r∗= ρ0
A+ lρ0 +
√[
(A+ l)−
(
1
ρ0
−1
)
l
]2+4 l2ρ0 (1−ρ0)
2A(1−ρ0) . (A.6)
When l = 0, we have 1+ r∗ = ρ0/(1−ρ0) > ρ0. When l > 0, we have 1+ r∗ > ρ0/(1−ρ0). This is obvious from the
equation i∗ = l/(1−ρ0−ρ0/(1+ r∗)).26
With l = 0, the second solution of equation (A.5) features positive (in fact zero) investment. It is given by i∗ = 0
and 1+ r∗ = 0. However, this does not correspond to a competitive equilibrium (which requires 1+ r∗ ≥ ρ0).
Proof of Proposition 1. We know that the steady state is the unique intersection of the function i →8i (i,0) with
the identity function i → i on [0,∞). We can compute
8i (0,0)=
A−
[
1
ρ0
−1
]
l+
√{
A−
[
1
ρ0
−1
]
l
}2+4 l2ρ0
2
> 0.
Similarly,8i (i,0)∼i→∞ ρ02 i . This ensures that8i (i,0) > i for i low enough and8i (i,0) < i for i high enough. Since
there is a unique positive solution to 8i (i,0) = i , this proves that 8i (i,0) > i for i < i∗ and 8i (i,0) < i for i > i∗.
Since, in addition, 8i (i,0) is increasing in i , we have that i∗ >8i (i,0) > i for i < i∗ and i∗ <8i (i,0) < i for i > i∗.
This ensures that this steady state is stable. ‖
Proof that r∗ increases with l. We have
dr∗
dl
= (1+ r
∗)−ρ0
2A(1−ρ0)
√
[Aρ0+ l]2−4Al(1−ρ0)ρ0
> 0.
A.2. Proofs for Section 3
Although we focus on the case l ≥ 0 in the text, the derivations in this section are also valid when l < 0, except for the
proof of Proposition 3 which is specific to the case l ≥ 0. We make use of some of these results when we turn to the case
l < 0 in Section 5.1.
Derivation of the closed-form expressions for the policy functions 8i , 8r , and 8b . The system of two equations
(equations (2) and (3)) in the two unknowns (it ,rt+1) can be solved as follows. Using equation (3) to find an expression
for rt+1 and replacing this expression in equation (2), we are led to the following quadratic equation:
i2t −
[
A+ρ0it−1− l
(
1
ρ0
−1
)]
it − l
(
l+bt +ρ0it−1
)
ρ0
.
Given a solution to this equation, we can then compute the associated interest rate 1+rt+1 = (ρ0it + l)/(A−bt ). When
l ≥ 0, bt < A is a necessary condition for equilibrium. When l < 0, we can have bt < A or bt ≥ A. Assume first that
bt < A. Then the only solution of equation (A.1) with it ≥ 0 and an associated interest rate such that 1+ rt+1 ≥ ρ0 is
given by it =8i (it−1,bt ) where
8i (it−1,bt )≡
A+ρ0it−1−
(
1
ρ0
−1
)
l+
√[
A+ρ0it−1−
(
1
ρ0
−1
)
l
]2+4 lρ0 (bt + l+ρ0it−1)
2
. (A.7)
26. Note that the analysis extends to the case l < 0. In this case, the function l/[1−ρ0/(1+ r∗)−ρ0] is convex
and increasing. It increases from−l/ρ0 to+∞ on
(
ρ0,
ρ0
1−ρ0
)
. The function [A(1+r∗)− l]/ρ0 is linear and increasing.
It increases from A− l /ρ0 >−l/ρ0 to A/(1−ρ0)− l/ρ0on
(
ρ0,
ρ0
1−ρ0
)
. The unique intersection of these functions on(
ρ0,
ρ0
1−ρ0
)
is given by equations (A.5) and (A.6). Hence, ρ0/(1−ρ0) > 1+ r∗ > ρ0.
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Using the asset demand equation (3) we can compute the associated interest rate 1+ rt+1 = 1+8r (it−1,bt ), where
1+8r (it−1,bt )≡ ρ0
A+ρ0it−1+
(
1+ 1ρ0
)
l+
√[
A+ρ0it−1−
(
1
ρ0
−1
)
l
]2+4 lρ0 (bt + l+ρ0it−1)
2(A−bt ) (A.8)
and the bubble in the next period bt+1 = 8r (it−1,bt ) ≡ [1+8r (it−1,bt )]bt . These equations determine the policy
function 8i , 8r , and 8b in closed form.
We now need to consider the case where l < 0 and bt ≥ A. In this case, there is a solution to the quadratic equation
(A.1) with it ≥ 0 and 1+ rt+1 ≥ ρ0 if and only if
[
A+ρ0it−1−
( 1
ρ0
−1)l]2+4 lρ0 (bt + l+ρ0it−1)≥ 0 and A−bt −l
ρ0
> bt + l+ρ0it−1. When these conditions hold, equations (A.7) and (A.8) still represent one solution with it ≥ 0 and
1+ rt+1 ≥ ρ0,27 but there is now another solution given by
it =
A+ρ0it−1−
(
1
ρ0
−1
)
l−
√[
A+ρ0it−1−
(
1
ρ0
−1
)
l
]2+4 lρ0 (bt + l+ρ0it−1)
2
and 1+rt+1 = (ρ0it + l)/(A−bt ). We argue that this solution has undesirable characteristics and focus on the solution
given by equations (A.7) and (A.8). Our motivation is that the other intersection displays perverse comparative statics: it
has the unnatural feature that an upward shift in the asset demand curve leads to a decrease in it−1 and a decrease in the
price 1/(1+ rt+1). This is because this solution corresponds to a point where the asset demand curve crosses the asset
supply curve from above at the intersection with the lowest value of it . By contrast, the asset demand curve crosses the
asset supply curve from below at the solution given by equations (A.7) and (A.8).
Derivation of the it = it−1 and bt+1 = bt schedules. Imposing it = it−1 in equation (2), we find
it−1
(
1−ρ0− ρ01+ rt+1
)
= l+bt . (A.9)
Using equation (3), we can replace 1/(1+ rt+1) in equation (A.9) by
1
1+ rt+1 =
A−bt
l+ρ0it−1 .
This yields the following equation for the it = it−1 schedule:
bt = i2t−1
ρ0
l
(1−ρ0)− ρ0it−1l
[
A+
(
2− 1
ρ0
)
l
]
− l.
Imposing rt+1 = 0 in equation (2), we find
it = l+bt +ρ0it−11−ρ0 . (A.10)
Imposing rt+1 = 0 in equation (3) and imposing rt+1 = 0, we find A = l + ρ0it + bt . Using equation (A.10) to
replace it , this expression can be rearranged as follows:
bt =−ρ20 it−1+ (1−ρ0)(A− l)−ρ0l,
yielding the desired equation for the bt+1 = bt schedule.
A useful Lemma.
Lemma 2. The interest rate rt+1 =8r (it−1,bt ) is increasing in it−1 and bt .
The proof of this lemma is as follows. In the derivation of the closed-form expressions for the policy functions 8i ,
8r , and 8b , we proved the following: at the solution given by equations (A.7) and (A.8), the asset demand curve (3)
27. In the particular case where bt = A, equation (A.7) gives it =−l/ρ0. Both the numerator and the denominator
in expression for 1+ rt+1 in equation (A.8) are zero. The value of the interest rate is not pinned down by this equation.
In this case, the value of the interest rate can be inferred from the asset supply equation
1+ rt+1 = ρ0itit − (l+bt +ρ0it−1) = ρ0
− lρ0
− lρ0 − (l+bt +ρ0it−1)
.
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crosses the asset supply curve (2) from below. Moreover, the asset supply curve is downward sloping. Since increases in
it−1 shift the asset supply curve upwards without affecting the asset demand curve, increases in bt shift the asset supply
curve upwards and the asset demand curve downwards. In both cases, the interest rate rt+1increases.
Proof of Lemmas 1 (and 3 in the Online Appendix). The properties of the interest rate rt+1 = 8r (it−1,bt )
are a direct consequence of Lemma 2. Let us turn to the properties of investment it = 8i (it−1,bt ). We can solve for
investment it as a function of it−1 and bt
it =
A+ρ0it−1+
[
1− 1ρ0
]
l+
√{
A+ρ0it−1+
[
1− 1ρ0
]
l
}2+4 lρ0 [bt + l+ρ0it−1]
2
.
From this expression, it is clear that it is increasing in it−1 and bt if l > 0 and decreases with bt if l < 0. The other
results follow directly from these properties of 8i and 8r .
The rest of Appendix A.2, with the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 can be found online, together with Appendices
A.3 and A.4.
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